TITLE: Intention and coordination in Hi-Lo Games

SPEAKER: Olivier Roy

ABSTRACT: In this talk we present enriched epistemic models of
strategic form games with future-directed intentions in order to 
characterize interpersonal coordination in Hi-Lo games. Three 
different characterization results are presented. The first underpins 
the claim that coordination is easily achieved in Hi-Lo situations. 
With the second result we revisit a claim from the philosophical 
literature concerning the puported epistemic support for intentions
of the form 'I intend that we ...', and show that it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for coordination. With the third 
characterisation we relate the intention-based approach to a 
well-known epistemic characterization of Nash Equilibrium. We finally 
show that intentions provide a plausible alternative to an existing 
account of coordination, the 'Stackelberg heuristics'.