

Strategies: A logic - automata study

Lecture 3: Game logic and its descendants

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- ▶ Existence of winning strategies used to analyze possibility of automaton offering suitable response for all possible provocations from an uncertain environment.
- ▶ Important applications in control synthesis and thus in the design and verification of systems.
- ▶ An emphasis on the size of *memory* needed.

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- ▶ A tradition of use in model theory, for model construction, comparing models etc.

Economists' games

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- ▶ A tradition of use in market design, information economics and some political analysis.

Structure of strategies

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- ▶ Perhaps combinatorial game theory is the only exception.
- ▶ Certainly, this is true of the studies above.

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- ▶ This suggests compositional structure in strategies.
- ▶ Something that logic is particularly good at.
- ▶ And this is best done by looking for compositional structure in **games**. For this viewing games as programs is useful.

Structured programs

Let Σ be a set of *atomic* programs. More complex programs are built from these using program composition.

$$Pr ::= a \in \Sigma \mid \pi_1 + \pi_2 \mid \pi_1; \pi_2 \mid \pi^*$$

- This is the class of *regular* or finite-state programs.

Regular operations

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- ▶ Assignment statements, input / output are all among atomic programs in Σ .

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- ▶ Alternatively, if we were given a set of states X , we can consider the program to be a mechanism that “achieves” X when started from s .
- ▶ If we were to see X as a ‘goal’, a program then sounds very much like a strategy to achieve the goal.

Predicate transformers

If α is a property (defined on states), we can think of a program π as a set of pairs (α, β) ; if π is started in a state where α holds, when π terminates, the resulting state is one in which β holds.

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- ▶ This is **Propositional dynamic logic**.

Nondeterministic programs

Consider the following (non-deterministic) program: let x, y be natural numbers.

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- ▶ When $x = y$, the program behaves non-deterministically: either x or y is incremented.
- ▶ Such programs can be thought as *1-player games*: when $x = y$, the player (Nature) has a choice of which transition to do.

Programs as games

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 $\pi(X) = Y$ denotes the following:

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$\pi(X) = Y$ denotes the following:

Y is the set of states starting from which Nature has a strategy to reach the set X of states.

Two player games

Does the addition of a second player make any essential difference ?

- ▶ Consider a game $\pi = (a + b); (e + f)$ where player I chooses to do either an a or b , and then player II chooses to do e or f .

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- ▶ We can think of it as a sequential composition of two one player games $(a + b)$ and $(e + f)$ with rôles of player and opponent “switched” in the two games.
- ▶ This idea leads us to **Propositional game logic**, which is similar to program logic, but admitting a player and an opponent.

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- ▶ $(a + b); (e + f)^d$ stands for the game where one player chooses between a and b and then the other player chooses between e and f .
- ▶ The formulas of the logic are as defined before: $\langle \pi \rangle \alpha$ now denotes that Player I has a strategy for playing game π and achieving α .

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- ▶ They go down recursively into the formula: I gets a turn when the connective is \vee or \exists . Similarly, II moves for \wedge and \forall . Negation is role reversal.
- ▶ These are the game logic operators. Fixed point constructors in the logic are associated with game iteration.

Game logic [Parikh 83]

A logic to reason about **determined** two person zero sum games.

Syntax

$$\blacktriangleright \Phi := p \mid \neg\alpha \mid \alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \mid \langle\gamma\rangle\alpha.$$

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- ▶ $\Phi := p \mid \neg\alpha \mid \alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \mid \langle \gamma \rangle \alpha.$
- ▶ $\Gamma := g \in \Gamma_0 \mid \gamma_1; \gamma_2 \mid \gamma_1 \cup \gamma_2 \mid \gamma^* \mid \gamma^d.$
 - ▶ Sequential composition - $\gamma_1; \gamma_2.$
 - ▶ Choice - $\gamma_1 \cup \gamma_2.$
 - ▶ Iteration - $\gamma^*.$
 - ▶ Dual - $\gamma^d.$

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- ▶ Final outcomes which players can enforce.

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Interpretation for games

- ▶ Final outcomes which players can enforce.
- ▶ Set of states S .
- ▶ Effectivity relation - $E_g \subseteq S \times 2^S$
 - ▶ $(s, X) \in E_g$ iff starting at s , in game g , player 1 can enforce the outcome to be in X .

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Model $M = (S, \{E_g \mid g \in \Gamma_0\}, V).$

Neighbourhood semantics

- ▶ $M, s \models \langle\gamma\rangle\alpha$ iff $\exists(s, X) \in E_\gamma$ such that $X \subseteq \{s' \mid M, s' \models \alpha\}.$

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- ▶ $M, s \models \langle\gamma\rangle\alpha$ iff $\exists(s, X) \in E_\gamma$ such that $X \subseteq \{s' \mid M, s' \models \alpha\}.$
- ▶ There **exists a strategy** in game γ to ensure $\alpha.$

Determined games

We talk about two person zero sum games of perfect information in this logic.

- ▶ The two players cannot have winning strategies for complementary winning positions, thus $\neg(\langle \pi \rangle \alpha \wedge \langle \pi^d \rangle \neg \alpha)$ is a valid formula, for every game π .

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- ▶ All games are **determined**, and hence $(<\pi>\alpha \vee <\pi^d>\neg\alpha)$ is valid.

Axiom system

- ▶ All the substitutional instances of tautologies of PC.
- ▶ $\langle g_1 \cup g_2 \rangle \alpha \equiv \langle g_1 \rangle \alpha \vee \langle g_2 \rangle \alpha.$
- ▶ $\langle g_1; g_2 \rangle \alpha \equiv \langle g_1 \rangle \langle g_2 \rangle \alpha.$
- ▶ $\langle g^* \rangle \alpha \equiv \alpha \vee \langle g \rangle \langle g^* \rangle \alpha.$
- ▶ $\langle g^d \rangle \alpha \equiv \neg \langle g \rangle \neg \alpha.$

Inference rules

$$(MP) \frac{\alpha, \alpha \supset \beta}{\beta} \quad (NG) \frac{\alpha \supset \beta}{\langle g \rangle \alpha \supset \langle g \rangle \beta}$$

$$(IND) \frac{\langle g \rangle \alpha \supset \alpha}{\langle g^* \rangle \alpha \supset \alpha}$$

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- ▶ The system without the duality axiom is easily seen to be complete for the dual-free fragment of the logic.
- ▶ In 1983, Parikh conjectured that the system presented is indeed complete for game logic.
- ▶ This remains an interesting open problem.

Technical results

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Technical results

- ▶ The satisfiability problem for the logic above is *EXPTIME*-complete.
- ▶ This is the same as that for propositional dynamic logic.
- ▶ Model checking game logic is equivalent to the same problem for the modal μ -calculus.
- ▶ Complexity of model checking is in $NP \cap co - NP$: a major open problem asks if it is in P .

Remarks on game logic

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- ▶ In classical game theory, notion of utility and action sets are primitive. GL is detached from these notions.
- ▶ Game expressions define rules for constructing extensive game forms over internal positions, while atomic game forms and utilities are provided in terms of world states.
- ▶ This mix of game theoretical concepts and computer science leads to a non-classical notion of great potential.

Relation to program logics

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- ▶ We can define a notion of *bisimulation* over game models and show that formulas of game logic are invariant under bisimulation.
- ▶ When we consider the natural notion of *modal alternation depth* of a formula, we find that the alternation hierarchy for game logic formulas does not collapse.
- ▶ There is a translation of game logic into propositional μ -calculus with 2 variables (and 1 variable does not suffice).

Translation

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- ▶ Three mappings X , Y and F are defined.
- ▶ X , Y translate game expressions into formulas with one variable X and Y respectively.
- ▶ F is the propositional translation.

The map X

- ▶ $g^X = \Diamond X$.
- ▶ $(g_1 + g_2)^X = g_1^X \vee g_2^X$.
- ▶ $(g_1; g_2)^X = g_1^X[X := g_2^X]$.
- ▶ $(g^d)^X = \neg g^X[X := \neg X]$.
- ▶ $(g^*)^X = \mu Y.(X \vee g^Y)$.

The map Y

- ▶ $g^Y = \Diamond Y$.
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The map F

- ▶ $p^F = p$.
- ▶ $(\neg\phi)^F = \neg\phi^F$.
- ▶ $(\phi_1 \vee \phi_2)^F = \phi_1^F \vee \phi_2^F$.
- ▶ $(\langle g \rangle \phi)^F = g^X[X := \phi^F]$.

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- ▶ $(\phi_1 \vee \phi_2)^F = \phi_1^F \vee \phi_2^F$.
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We can then show that ϕ and ϕ^F are equivalent.

Departures

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- ▶ Non-determined games.
- ▶ Multi-player games.
- ▶ Overlapping objectives.
- ▶ More interesting game operators.

Explicit strategies

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Players' strategic response need to take into account:

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At the logical level:

- ▶ Game composition and structured strategies are *not* independent entities.
- ▶ Games and strategies need to be composed together.

N-person game logic

Game logic: $\langle \gamma \rangle \alpha$

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N-person game logic: $\langle \gamma, i \rangle \alpha$

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Semantics

$\mathcal{M} = (S, \{\rho_g^i \mid g \in \Gamma_0\}, V)$, where $\rho_g^i \subseteq S \times \mathcal{P}(S)$ is monotonic.

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What are the properties?

- ▶ How do we define the semantics?
- ▶ What is the truth definition of $\langle \gamma_1 \cup \gamma_2, i \rangle \varphi$?
- ▶ What kind of validities does this logic have?
- ▶ Is $\neg(\langle \gamma, i \rangle \varphi \wedge \langle \gamma, j \rangle \neg \varphi)$ valid?

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

Any other reasonable operator for combining games?

- ▶ Choice, Sequential composition, Iteration
- ▶ We would now have a look at **parallel composition** of games.
- ▶ We consider two ways of looking at it : Intersection and interleaving
- ▶ Intersection: neighbourhood models
- ▶ Interleaving: tree models


Simultaneous games

- ▶ Game models: $\mathcal{M} = (S, \{\rho_g^i \mid g \in \Gamma\}, V)$, where $\rho_g^i \subseteq S \times \mathcal{P}(S)$ is monotonic.
- ▶ Simultaneous game models: $\mathcal{M} = (S, \{\rho_g^i \mid g \in \Gamma\}, V)$, where $\rho_g^i \subseteq S \times \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{P}(S))$ is monotonic.
The set lifting is considered to differentiate between union, intersection and parallel composition of games.

A toy example




A toy example



1's ability : $\{\{a\}\}, \{\{b\}\}$.



2's ability : $\{\{a\}, \{b\}\}$.



1's ability : $\{\{c\}, \{d\}\}$.

2's ability : $\{\{c\}\}, \{\{d\}\}$.

A toy example



1's ability : $\{\{a, c\}, \{a, d\}\}, \{\{b, c\}, \{b, d\}\}$.

2's ability : $\{\{a, c\}, \{b, c\}\}, \{\{a, d\}, \{b, d\}\}$.

Each outcome state is a set read '**conjunctively**', but players have choices leading to sets of these read '**disjunctively**' as in case of game logic.

Simultaneous two-player game logic

Language:

$$\gamma := g \mid \gamma; \gamma \mid \gamma \cup \gamma \mid \gamma^d \mid \gamma \times \gamma$$

$$\phi := \perp \mid p \mid \neg \phi \mid \phi \vee \phi \mid \langle \gamma, i \rangle \phi$$

Simultaneous game model: $\mathcal{M} = (S, \{\rho_g^i \mid g \in \Gamma\}, V)$

$\mathcal{M}, s \models \langle \gamma, i \rangle \phi$ iff there exists $X : s\rho_\gamma^i X$ and $\forall x \in UX : \mathcal{M}, x \models \phi$

Composite games

$$s\rho_{G \cup G'}^1 X \quad \text{iff} \quad s\rho_G^1 X \text{ or } s\rho_{G'}^1 X.$$

$$s\rho_{G \cup G'}^2 X \quad \text{iff} \quad s\rho_G^2 X \text{ and } s\rho_{G'}^2 X.$$

$$s\rho_{G^d}^1 X \quad \text{iff} \quad s\rho_G^2 X.$$

$$s\rho_{G^d}^2 X \quad \text{iff} \quad s\rho_G^1 X.$$

$$s\rho_{G;G'}^i X \quad \text{iff} \quad \exists U : s\rho_G^i U \text{ and for each } u \in \bigcup U, \\ u\rho_{G'}^i X.$$

$$s\rho_{G \times G'}^i X \quad \text{iff} \quad \exists T, \exists W : s\rho_G^i T \text{ and } s\rho_{G'}^i W \text{ and} \\ X = \{t \cup w : t \in T \text{ and } w \in W\}.$$

Complete axiomatization

a) all propositional tautologies and inference rules

b) if $\vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi$ then $\vdash \langle \gamma, i \rangle \phi \rightarrow \langle \gamma, i \rangle \psi$

c) reduction axioms:

$$\langle \alpha \cup \beta, 1 \rangle \phi \leftrightarrow \langle \alpha, 1 \rangle \phi \vee \langle \beta, 1 \rangle \phi$$

$$\langle \alpha \cup \beta, 2 \rangle \phi \leftrightarrow \langle \alpha, 2 \rangle \phi \wedge \langle \beta, 2 \rangle \phi$$

$$\langle \gamma^d, 1 \rangle \phi \leftrightarrow \langle \gamma, 2 \rangle \phi$$

$$\langle \gamma^d, 2 \rangle \phi \leftrightarrow \langle \gamma, 1 \rangle \phi$$

$$\langle \alpha; \beta, i \rangle \phi \leftrightarrow \langle \alpha, i \rangle \langle \beta, i \rangle \phi$$

$$\langle \alpha \times \beta, i \rangle \phi \leftrightarrow \langle \alpha, i \rangle \phi \wedge \langle \beta, i \rangle \phi$$

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Consider $\langle \alpha \times \alpha, i \rangle \phi$!

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Consider $\langle \alpha \times \alpha, i \rangle \phi$! Composing the same games will give us back a single game, which do not agree with the spirit of what we were talking about earlier: Having games played in parallel, and copying strategies from one to the other.

Interleaving games

The general focus is on:

- ▶ an interleaving operator in the context of extensive form game trees looking into the structure of the games;
- ▶ information transfer from one game to another made possible by some common player enacting in all the games concerned;
- ▶ strategizing based on such information transfer.

This attempt

A formal study on the algebra of game composition: choice, iteration, sequential and parallel composition.

- ▶ A dynamic logic for game expressions extended with parallel composition.
- ▶ Extensive form games embedded in Kripke structures.
- ▶ Focus on interleavings of moves of players in the tree structure.

Composing game trees



Atomic games: Extensive form games

- ▶ Finite tree - nodes represent game positions labelled with players.
- ▶ Edge relation - specifies the moves which are enabled at a particular position.


Composite games:

- ▶ choice $(g_1 \cup g_2)$;
- ▶ sequential composition $(g_1; g_2)$;
- ▶ iteration (g^*) ;
- ▶ parallel composition $(g_1 \parallel g_2)$.




Sequential composition







Sequential composition



Sequential composition




Sequential composition




$$T \in T_1; \{T_2, T_3\}$$

Parallel composition

Same game; different players.




T_4



T_5


Parallel composition




$$T \in T_4 \parallel T_5$$

Parallel composition

Different games; different players.




T_6



T_7

Parallel composition



$$T \in T_6 \parallel T_7$$

The logic

Syntax

- ▶ $\Phi := p \in P \mid \neg\alpha \mid \alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \mid \langle g, i \rangle \alpha.$
- ▶ $\Gamma := h \in \mathbb{H} \mid g_1; g_2 \mid g_1 \cup g_2 \mid g_1 \parallel g_2.$

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Tree semantics

- ▶ $M, w \models \langle g, i \rangle \alpha$ iff there exists $X \in R_g^i$ such that X constitutes a **valid tree**, $\text{root}(X) = w$ and for all $v \in \text{frontier}(X)$, $M, v \models \alpha$. .

At a state w , a tree X in the “tree language” associated with g is enabled at w , and player i has a strategy (subtree) in it to ensure α .

Tree semantics

To define the semantic relation, we need to fix:

- ▶ Tree language associated with the game g .

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

Model

- ▶ Model - Kripke structure.
 - ▶ A finite set of states W .
 - ▶ Labelled edge relation $\longrightarrow \subseteq W \times \Sigma \times W$.
 - ▶ Valuation function $V : W \rightarrow 2^P$.
 - ▶ Player labelling function $\lambda : W \rightarrow N$.




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- ▶ Tree language for atomic games h .
 - ▶ if h is enabled at w , $R_h^i(w) \subseteq 2^{(W \times W)^*}$ encodes the set of all available strategies for player i in the game h enabled at w .
 - ▶ $R_h^i = \bigcup_{w \in W} R_h^i(w)$.



Game enabled



Game enabled




Game enabled



Game - h

$$\{(u, w_1)(w_1, w_3), (u, w_1)(w_1, w_4)\}, \\ \{(u, w_2)(w_2, w_4), (u, w_2)(w_2, w_5)\} \in R_h^1$$



Valid tree

Legal sequence ϱ : $(u, w)(v, x)$ in ϱ **implies** $w = v$.

$X \in 2^{(W \times W)^*}$ is a **valid tree** if:

- ▶ for all sequence $\varrho \in X$, ϱ is legal;
- ▶ X is prefix closed.

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Root and frontier

In a valid tree X ,

- ▶ for all $\varrho, \varrho' \in X$, $\text{first}(\varrho)[1] = \text{first}(\varrho')[1] = \text{root}(X)$;
- ▶ $\text{frontier}(X) = \{\text{last}(\varrho)[2] \mid \varrho \in X\}$.

Composite game relations

- ▶ $X \in R_h^i \implies$ tree structure $\mathfrak{T}(X)$
- ▶ finite game tree $\mathfrak{T} \implies f(\mathfrak{T}) \in 2^{(W \times W)^*}$

Interpretation

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Interpretation

- ▶ $R_{g_1 \cup g_2}^i = R_{g_1}^i \cup R_{g_2}^i;$
- ▶ $R_{g_1; g_2}^i = \{f(\mathfrak{T}(X); \mathcal{T}) \mid X \in R_{g_1}^i \text{ and } \mathcal{T} = \{\mathfrak{T}(X_1), \dots, \mathfrak{T}(X_k)\} \text{ where } \{X_1, \dots, X_k\} \subseteq R_{g_2}^i\};$

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- ▶ $R_{g_1 \parallel g_2}^i = \{f(\mathfrak{T}(X_1) \parallel \mathfrak{T}(X_2)) \mid X_1 \in R_{g_1}^i \text{ and } X_2 \in R_{g_2}^i\}$.

A satisfiable formula

Consider the game trees T_4 and T_5 .

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Consider the game trees T_4 and T_5 .

Suppose $M, w \models \bigwedge_{a_j \in \{a,b\}} (\langle a_j \rangle \text{True} \wedge [a_j](\bigwedge_{a_j \in \{a,b\}} \langle a_j \rangle (\bigwedge_{a_j \in \{c,d\}} (\langle a_j \rangle \text{True} \wedge [a_j](\bigwedge_{a_j \in \{c,d\}} \langle a_j \rangle \text{True}))))$;
and, $M, w \models T_4^\vee$.

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and, $M, w \models T_4^\vee$.

Then it follows that,

$$M, w \models \langle T_4, 1 \rangle \alpha \rightarrow \langle T_4 \parallel T_5, 2 \rangle \alpha.$$

Axiom system

► $\langle h, i \rangle \alpha \equiv ?$

(Informally): Game h is enabled **and** player i has a strategy given by a sub-tree X of the enabled game such that $\text{frontier}(X)$ satisfies α .

Axiom system

- ▶ $\langle h, i \rangle \alpha \equiv h^\vee \wedge \downarrow_{(h,i,\alpha)}$ (push)

(Informally): Game h is enabled **and** player i has a strategy given by a sub-tree X of the enabled game such that $\text{frontier}(X)$ satisfies α .


- ▶ $\langle a \rangle \alpha$ - can be encoded in the logic.
- ▶ h^\vee can be defined.

Definition of *push*

h is a single node:

- ▶ $\downarrow_{(h,i,\alpha)} = \alpha$.


Axiom system



$\downarrow (h, i, \alpha)$ holds at state u :

- ▶ if u is a player i node
 - ▶ then $\exists w$ such that $u \xrightarrow{a} w$ and $\langle h_a, i \rangle \alpha$ holds at w .

Axiom system



$\downarrow (h, i, \alpha)$ holds at state u :

- ▶ if u is a player i node
 - ▶ then $\exists w$ such that $u \xrightarrow{a} w$ and $\langle h_a, i \rangle \alpha$ holds at w .
- ▶ if u is node taken by a player in \bar{i}
 - ▶ $\forall a_j$ such that $u \xrightarrow{a_j} w$, $\langle h_{a_j}, i \rangle \alpha$ holds at w .

Axiom system

General idea behind *push*

- ▶ If the root is a player i -node then
 - ▶ an edge is chosen and the requirement is “pushed” to the relevant subtree.
- ▶ If the root is a node taken by a player in \bar{i} then
 - ▶ all outgoing edges need to be taken into account and the requirement is “pushed” to all the resulting subtrees.

Axiom system

- ▶ Propositional axioms:
 - ▶ All the substitutional instances of tautologies of PC.
 - ▶ $\mathbf{turn}_i \equiv \bigwedge_{j \in \bar{i}} \neg \mathbf{turn}_j$.
- ▶ Axiom for single edge games:
 - ▶ $\langle a \rangle (\alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2) \equiv \langle a \rangle \alpha_1 \vee \langle a \rangle \alpha_2$.
 - ▶ $\langle a \rangle \mathbf{turn}_i \supset [a] \mathbf{turn}_i$.
- ▶ Reduction axioms:
 - ▶ $\langle g_1 \cup g_2, i \rangle \alpha \equiv \langle g_1, i \rangle \alpha \vee \langle g_2, i \rangle \alpha$.
 - ▶ $\langle g_1; g_2, i \rangle \alpha \equiv \langle g_1, i \rangle \langle g_2, i \rangle \alpha$.
 - ▶ $\langle g_1 \parallel g_2, i \rangle \alpha \equiv \bigvee_{h \in \mathit{init}(g_1 \parallel g_2)} \mathit{head}_h^\vee \wedge \mathit{comp}^i(h, g_1, g_2, \alpha)$

Inference rules

$$(MP) \frac{\alpha, \alpha \supset \beta}{\beta} \qquad (NG) \frac{\alpha}{[a]\alpha}$$

Parallel reduction axiom

Modelling interleaving of players.

Init and Residue

- ▶ **Init:** $init(g)$ = the initial (atomic) game of g .
- ▶ **Residue:** $g \setminus h$ = the game expression generated after playing the initial atomic game h in $init(g)$.

Parallel reduction axiom

Modelling interleaving of players.

Init and Residue

- ▶ **Init:** $init(g) =$ the initial (atomic) game of g .
- ▶ **Residue:** $g \setminus h =$ the game expression generated after playing the initial atomic game h in $init(g)$.

Parallel reduction axiom: intuitive idea

- ▶ There exists an atomic tree $h \in init(g_1 \parallel g_2)$ such that $head(h)$ is enabled.
- ▶ Player i has a strategy in $head(h)$ which when composed with a strategy in the residue ensures α . We use $comp^i(h, g_1, g_2, \alpha)$ to denote this property.

Expressing $comp^i(h, g_1, g_2, \alpha)$

Suppose $h = (S, \Rightarrow, s_0, \hat{\lambda})$, $A = moves(s_0) = \{a_1, \dots, a_k\}$.

If $h \in init(g_1)$, $h \in init(g_2)$ and,

- ▶ $\hat{\lambda}(s_0) = i$ then $comp^i(h, g_1, g_2, \alpha) = \bigvee_{a_j \in A} (\langle a_j \rangle \langle (h_{a_j}; (g_1 \setminus h)) \parallel g_2 \rangle \alpha \vee \langle a_j \rangle \langle g_1 \parallel (h_{a_j}; (g_2 \setminus h)) \rangle \alpha)$.
- ▶ $\hat{\lambda}(s_0) \in \bar{i}$ then $comp^i(h, g_1, g_2, \alpha) = \bigwedge_{a_j \in A} ([a_j] \langle (h_{a_j}; (g_1 \setminus h)) \parallel g_2 \rangle \alpha \vee [a_j] \langle g_1 \parallel (h_{a_j}; (g_2 \setminus h)) \rangle \alpha)$.

Decidability

A formula is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable in an exponential sized model.

Given α to decide if α is satisfiable:

- ▶ Guess an exponential sized model M .
- ▶ Explicitly build the relation $R_g^i \subseteq 2^{(W \times W)^*}$.
 - ▶ Time: exponential in the size of the model.
- ▶ Check whether M satisfies α .

Coalition logic

Language:

$$\phi := \perp \mid p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \vee \phi \mid [C]\phi$$

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$\mathcal{M}, s \models [C]\phi$ iff $sE_C X$, where $X = \{x \in S : \mathcal{M}, x \models \phi\}$

$[C]\phi$ holds at a state s iff coalition C is effective for the truth-set of ϕ .

Which book to read?

- ▶ A father of 3 daughters would like to read a book on the relationship between sexes.
- ▶ He wants his daughters' opinion regarding which book to read.
- ▶ Simon de Beauvoir's "Le deuxième sexe" or Susan Faludi's "Backlash".
- ▶ The majority opinion will decide.

Which book to read?

$$\varphi = [\{1, 2\}]b \wedge [\{2, 3\}]b$$

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$$\varphi = [\{1, 2\}]b \wedge [\{2, 3\}]b$$

$$S = \{s, b, f\}$$

$$E(s)$$

	B	F		B	F
B	b	b	B	b	f
F	b	f	F	f	f

Daughter 1 is the row player, 2 is the column player and 3 decides between the tables.

Model checking

Given \mathcal{M} and ϕ , find $\phi^{\mathcal{M}}$

$\phi^{\mathcal{M}}$ can be calculated in time $\mathcal{O}(|\mathcal{M}| \times |\phi|)$

Axiomatics

Mon

► propositional tautologies,

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{► } \varphi, \varphi \rightarrow \psi \\ \hline \psi \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{► } \varphi \rightarrow \psi \\ \hline [C]\varphi \rightarrow [C]\psi \end{array}$$

Satisfiability

Given a formula ϕ , does there exist a model \mathcal{M} and a state s , such that $\mathcal{M}, s \models \phi$

Result : *Mon* is NP-complete.